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Abstract
We analyze optimal competition policy by a Competition Agency (CA)
in a model with two countries, North and South, were a ￿nal good is
produced by Northern oligopolistic ￿rms using an input that can either be
produced within the ￿rm (vertical integration) or outsourced to Southern
oligopolistic producers with lower labor costs (outsourcing). In the case
where the ￿nal good is only consumed in the North and there is free
entry in the South, we ￿nd that optimal competition policy in the North
is the adoption of a tougher stance. However, with a CA in the South,
the Southern CA would optimally appropriate outsourcing rents through
restrictions on the degree of competition among domestic ￿rms. In this
casem the optimal response of the Northern CA would be inaction. In
the case where the ￿nal good is consumed in both countries, we ￿nd that
optimal competition policy in the South is marginally a⁄ected by the
share of Southern consumption, leaving relatively important incentives to
engage in rent-shifting. However, for a high enough share of Southern
consumption, the interaction between the Northern and Southern CA is
shown to be of the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma type, whereby the Nash equilibrium
is Pareto-suboptimal and mutual cooperation on competition policy is
globally desirable.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze optimal competition policy when ￿rms
delocalize production of intermediate inputs abroad. What has been termed
"global production shifting" is a complex phenomenon by which the production
of goods (and increasingly also services) is spread across di⁄erent ￿rms and/or
di⁄erent countries. To clarify the terminology used in this paper, a few de￿n-
itions are useful. Broadly speaking, a ￿rm that uses one or more intermediate
inputs in the production of a ￿nal good can decide to produce its inputs within
its boundaries or to outsource its production to an independent supplier. In
the former case, the ￿rm engages in vertical integration if it produces the input
domestically, and in foreign direct investment (FDI) and intra-￿rm trade if the
input is produced abroad. In the case of outsourcing, on the other hand, the ￿rm
can either buy the input domestically (domestic outsourcing), or buy it from a
1foreign supplier, engaging in arm￿ s length trade (foreign outsourcing).1Foreign
outsourcing is equivalent to o⁄shoring, de￿ned in the business literature as the
movement of a business process done at a company in one country to the same
or another company in another country. Given these de￿nitions, companies sub-
contracting in the same country would be outsourcing, but not o⁄shoring. A
company moving an internal business unit from one country to another would be
o⁄shoring, but not outsourcing. A company subcontracting a business unit to a
di⁄erent company in another country would be both outsourcing and o⁄shoring.
In our model, we deal with the case of foreign outsourcing. Throughout our pa-
per we analyze the case of "foreign outsourcing", whereby ￿rms from one nation
(that we call "North") outsource the production of intermediate inputs to ￿rms
in another nation (that we call the "South"). For simplicity, we sometimes use
the compact term "outsourcing".
Over the last twenty years outsourcing has become increasingly important.
Yeats [27] ￿nds that trade in intermediates accounts for approximately 30 per-
cent of total trade in the US. He also notices that this ￿gure may be signi￿cantly
larger for developing countries, as they have progressively become the focus of
outsourcing from developed countries. Hanson et al. [15] show how foreign
outsourcing by US ￿rms has grown at paces exceeding the growth of intra-￿rm
trade within the same ￿rms.
As noted by Spencer [26], a common motive for international procurement
of intermediate inputs either through outsourcing or through intra-￿rm trans-
actions (FDI) is to reduce costs by producing in low wage countries. China is
certainly a point in case. With the liberalization of trade and services and the
accession of China to the WTO, many ￿rms started to shift production of inter-
mediate manufactured goods there. The share of processing exports (i.e., goods
produced using imported inputs) in total manufacturing exports has increased
from 35 percent in 1988 to 57 percent in 2003 [26].Outsourcing constitutes a
big part of this. The phenomenon is especially marked in the electronic and
computer industry, where the components are produced in China and Taiwan
and then assembled in Ireland for instance.
As economic integration has processed, policy makers and scholars have
recognized the possible links between trade and competition policy. In partic-
ular, as argued by Horn and Levinsohn [21], they have "started to ponder the
possible con￿ icts arising from nationally pursued competition policies in a more
uni￿ed goods market".
Our study contributes to this ongoing debate, analyzing the theoretical links
between outsourcing and competition policy through a simple model with two
countries, North and South. Our starting point is the observation that outsourc-
ing is related to cost savings. In a less than perfectly competitive market, thus,
outsourcing will be associated with rents, which can be shifted through an active
competition policy. We thus assume throughout the paper an oligopolistic mar-
ket structure, where ￿rms engage in quantity competition, and a Competition
1This is the common classi￿cation done by trade economists, see for example Antr￿s and
Helpman [2].
2Agency (CA) in the North that optimally sets the number of ￿rms by maxi-
mizing domestic welfare. Concerning the South, we consider the two di⁄erent
scenarios of no Competition Agency and presence of Competition Agency, with
a similar institutional role as its Northern homologue.
The paper is broadly divided in two parts. The ￿rst analyzes the case where
the ￿nal good - which is just a relabeling of the intermediate input - is only
consumed in the North. This could be thought of as the initial stage of a devel-
opment process whereby Southern consumers progressively acquire purchasing
power as the country develops. The second part deals with a scenario where
consumers are more evenly distributed geographically - which can be thought
of as a more advance stage of development.
In the ￿rst part, we start with an initial equilibrium were, due to prohibitive
trade costs, the industry structure is one of vertical integration, so that each ￿rm
in the North produces both the input and the ￿nal good. If, as a result of trade
liberalization, outsourcing becomes viable, we show that optimal competition
policy in the North dictates the adoption of a tougher stance if there is free
entry in the South, or inaction if there is a Competition Policy in the South.
The reason is that the Southern CA will entirely appropriate outsourcing rents,
leaving Northern ￿rms indi⁄erent between outsourcing and vertical integration
and leaving the problem of the Northern CA unchanged. We thus show that
competition policy can entirely substitute for trade policy as a rent-shifting
device. However, rent-shifting is not Pareto e¢ cient. From a global welfare
perspective, free entry in the South would be optimal (we assume no ￿xed
costs for Southern ￿rms). Since the Southern CA has no interest in consumer
protection, from an institutional perspective the optimal outcome can only be
achieved if we allow for monetary transfers from the North to the South.
The second part deals with the scenario in which the ￿nal good is consumed
in both countries. With an increasing number of Southern consumers, the pro-
tection of the consumer surplus becomes more attractive for the Southern CA.
If the share of Southern consumers in world consumption is high enough, the
interaction between Competition Agencies assumes the traits of a standard Pris-
oner￿ s Dilemma: both would prefer mutual cooperation (de￿ned as free entry in
the absence of ￿xed costs) to mutual defection (de￿ned as the optimal unilateral
setting of competition policy), but there is a unilateral incentive to defect that
leads to a Pareto-ine¢ ceint Nash equilibrium. From an institutional perspective,
the optimal outcome can be achieved through an agreement between Compe-
tition Agencies that makes mutual cooperation more attractive than unilateral
defection.
The main message of our paper is that if globalization leads to higher growth
rates of consumption in the South than in the North, the incentives to use
competition policy as a mean to shift rents in a beggar-thy-neighbor fashion may
actually shrink, and the establishment of mutual agreements on the conduct of
competition policy may become more attractive.
32 Literature review
The issue of how ￿rms organize their production on a global scale has recently
received new attention in Economics, particularly in International Trade. A
growing body of literature has looked at the organizational choices of individual
￿rms using relatively new theories of the ￿rm from industrial organization. The
resulting literature has been labeled "new new trade theory". The ￿rst strand
of this "new new trade theory", popularized by Melitz [23], looks at ￿rm-level
di⁄erences in productivity, and their e⁄ects on trade and investment decisions
(Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple [18]). Concerning the decision of business ￿rms,
it mostly focuses on the choice of which markets to enter, which depends on size
and productivity of ￿rms. The second branch of new new trade theory, based on
the property rights approach to the theory of the ￿rm introduced by Grossman
and Hart [11] and Hart and Moore [20], analyzes organizational decisions of busi-
ness ￿rms, to explain the causes and conditions underlying across-boundaries
fragmentation of production. Most of the literature in the second branch of
"new new" trade theory uses the Grossman-Hart-Moore approach to explain
the "make or buy" decision, that is, the decision to produce intermediate inputs
within the boundary of a vertically integrated ￿rm or to contract out the supply
of inputs to an external specialized producer.
A common denominator of these models is the use of Dixit-Stiglitz mo-
nopolistic competition framework among ￿nal good producers. They assume a
potentially large number of varieties to be produced, and monopoly over the
production of each of them.2 In such a framework, there is not much role for
competition policy: the best a Competition Agency can do is to leave the num-
ber of ￿rms to be determined by free entry.
There is also a rich international trade literature on the issue of rent-
extraction under imperfect competition. This literature is based on the simple
consideration that when markets are less than perfectly competitive, there are
rents that can be extracted. The focus has been on trade policy as the instru-
ment to shift and appropriate rents. A standard result in this literature is that
the imposition of a tari⁄ (import subsidy) is the optimal rent-extraction policy
vis-￿-vis a foreign monopolist or oligopolist facing linear (CES) demand (Bran-
der Spencer [6]). When market power is on both domestic and foreign market,
the appropriate policy instrument to shift rents from the foreign to the home
country is an export subsidy (under Cournot competition between a domestic
and a foreign ￿rm) or an export tax (under Bertrand competition) (Brander
and Spencer [7], Eaton and Grossman [9]).
A major contention of our paper is that competition policy can be used as
a rent-extraction tool. Competition policy, we argue, can entirely substitute for
trade policy as a rent-shifting instruments for the South. This result is linked to
the oft-made argument that international trade liberalization, by limiting the
possibility of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy, induces countries to instead use
2A recent contribution by Bernard, Redding and Schott ([4]) introduces multi-product
￿rms in a Melitz-type model to distinguish between extensive and intensive margin e⁄ects of
trade liberalization.
4beggar-thy-neighbor competition policy.
Horn and Levinsohn [21] investigate the link between merger policy (de￿ned
as the choice of the optimal level of industry concentration) and trade liber-
alization in a partial-equilibrim, two-countries model. They ￿nd no clear-cut
relationship between international trade liberalization an merger policy. In other
words, they do not establish whether the two are complement or substitutes.
On the other hand, we ￿nd that, with a Competition Authority in the South,
outsourcing is systematically coupled with rent extraction, with the degree of
rent extraction depending on the geographical distribution of consumers and
marginal cost savings. This is due to the fact that we present di⁄erent aspects
of globalization: for Horn and Levinsohn, trade liberalization brings two-way
trade in identical product. In our model, it brings trade of intermediates in one
direction and of ￿nal goods in the other.
It is useful to point out that we do not make a case for anti-competitive
practices for developing countries, except in the polar case of no consumption
of the ￿nal good in the South. On the contrary, under the more reasonable
assumption that consumers are distributed in both countries, we show that those
practices are sub-optimal from a global perspective. However, we also show that
in a decentralized (Nash) setting of competition policy, there exists incentives to
use competition policy as a mean to appropriate outsourcing rents. This points
to the issue of whether competition policy, and in particular the adoption of
restrictive practices, can sustain development.3
Some scholars have argued that lax enforcement of competition policy is
second-best instrument to increase investments (higher prices leading to more
funds to be invested by the ￿rm), the ￿rst-best being direct policy instruments
such as subsidies. There is a debate as to whether lax competition policy helped
spurring development in East Asia. Porter et al. (cited in [10]), for example,
￿nd that e⁄orts to restrict competition through cartels were rarely found in
successful industries but were far more prevalent in unsuccessful ones.
Our work is also related to the issue of institutional multilateralization of
competition policy, which has attracted quite some attention in policy circles.
This issue was also on the agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
with the EU advancing the proposal for a Global Agreement on Competition
(MAC). However, it was dropped from the Work Programmes of the Doha
Round, thanks to the opposition of most developing countries - on the basis
of their unwillingness to surrender the "policy space" for implementing indus-
trial policies discriminating in favor of domestic ￿rms and promoting national
champions - and the ambivalence of the US.4 Proponents of a global MAC have
argued that such an agreement could be mutually bene￿cial to developed and
developing countries. To the former, mostly because of market access; to the
latter - some authors have argued - for the following reasons: a) An MAC e⁄ec-
tively dealing with international export cartels would help developing countries
getting cheaper inputs;5 b) an MAC could limit the abuse of anti-dumping prac-
3The following paragraph draws on Evenett et al [10].
4See Bhattacharjea [5].
5The view that private international cartels e⁄ectively distort international trade has been
5tices by developed countries by establishing more severe principles under which
alledgedly predatory pricing is punishable; c) curbing the abuse of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPRs) as e⁄ective cartel-types arrangements without an actual
cartel agreement.6
Clearly, a major contention of this literature is that the most harmful anti-
competitive practices are by developed countries￿￿rms through cartelization.7In
our paper we clearly distinguish between the two cases of free entry (aka perfect
competition) and restriction of competition (via a Competition Authority) on
the input market. The latter case, we believe, has not received signi￿cant at-
tention in the cited literature. At the same time we would like to emphasize our
normative case for cooperation in competition policy - under some conditions
on the geographical distribution of ￿nal good consumption.
After this review of the related literature, we now present a theoretical model
that analyzes the links between competition policy and outsourcing. Since the
geographical distribution of ￿nal good consumers is the key variable a⁄ecting
our results, we ￿rst analyze the case in which all consumption is in the North
- ￿rstly by assuming free entry in the South, then by assuming optimal setting
of the number of Southern ￿rms. We then consider the model with consumers
in both countries, and analyze the interaction between ￿rms and Competition
Authorities.
3 The model with consumers only in the North
Consider a simple setting with consumers maximizing the following quasi-linear
utility function:


















where qi is the output of an homogenous consumption good by ￿rm i, and M
represents the aggregate measure of all the other goods is the economy, treated
as numeraire. Straightforward utility maximitazion yields linear demand of the
form:
pi = ￿ ￿ ￿Q (1)
advanced by Levenstein and Suslow [22], who show that the forty-odd international cartels
that had been prosecuted in the US and the EU operated in various regions of the world, lasted
several years and a⁄ected a wide range of products. Whether an MAC would e⁄ectively help
dealing with international cartels, however, is disputable. Evenett et al. [10], for example,
emphasize the enormous asymmetries of interests and capabilities between developed and de-
volping countries involved. Moreover, for an MAC to be e⁄ective in dealing with international
cartels, it would require international jurisdiction.
6Bhattacharjea [5].
7Evenett et al [10] further notice that in economies which are recipeints of FDI, there is
the issue of restrining multinationals from establishing dominant positions wy driving out of
the market (or by acquiring) small, local ￿rms which cannot compete with large productive
foreign ￿rms. A case in point cited by the authors is Argentina, where merger control was






Without loss of generality, we set ￿ = 1. We assume that the homogenous con-
sumption good is produced by symmetric ￿rms engaging in Cournot (quantity)
competition. A typical producer i hires low skilled labor (L) and high skilled
labor (H) to produce the ￿nal good, with a cost structure that comprises both
variable and ￿xed costs:
TCi = waLqi + raHf (2)
where w is the reward to unskilled labor, aL is the unit unskilled labor require-
ment (an inverse measure of the productivity of L workers), qi is the ￿rm￿ s
output, r is the (exogenous) reward to unskilled labor, aH its unit requirement
and f is a measure of ￿xed costs. We assume that unskilled labor is only used
in the variable component of the cost function, and skilled labor is only used in
the ￿xed cost component. We think of ￿xed costs as costs related to start-up,
research and development, marketing, logistics and all other activities that can
only be performed by high skilled workers. Variable costs, on the other hand,
are the costs related to the physical production of the ￿nal good.
Production of the ￿nal good requires an intermediate input, which can either
be produced within the ￿rm (case of vertical integration) or outsourced to a
specialized producer. The technology for the ￿nal good production is simple:
in order to produce one unit of ￿nal good, one unit of the input is needed. In
other words, the ￿nal good is simply a relabeling of the intermediate.8
Specialized intermediate producers use only unskilled labor, with a unit labor
requirement equal to aL. Crucially. we assume that specialized intermediate
producers are only located abroad (the "South"), and have exogenously lower
marginal costs of production.9We justify this assumption as follows: assume
aL = a￿
L, where a￿
L is the unit labor requirement in the production of the
intermediate good in the South.10Next, let perfect competition and free trade
in the numeraire: if aI is the unit labor requirement at home (the "North") -
a￿
I in the South - and w is the reward to labor in the North - w￿ in the South
- marginal cost pricing respectively yields w = 1
aI and w￿ = 1
a￿
I . In words,
the wage is pinned down by the productivity in the outside sector. By free
trade in the numeraire, the law of one price applies: pM = p￿
M = 1. Then
the following relation holds: w￿ < w if, and only if, a￿
I > aI. Lower marginal
costs of production of the intermediate good in the South are insured by letting
aL = a￿
L and a￿
I > aI. In words, by assuming that the North and the South
are equally e¢ cient in the production of intermediate goods, but the North is
8For a similar assumption, see for example Grossman and Helpman [13].
9The same assumption is made by Shy and Stenbacka [25], who however consider the
multiple-input case. In their paper, too, there is Cournot competition among ￿nal good
producers - introduced to study the e⁄ect of increased competition on the range of outsourced
inputs and the strategic interactions between outsourcing ￿rms.
10We consider the case in which the technology to produce the intermediate good is mature
and standardized, so that every country has acces to it.
7more productive in the outside sector, so that the reward to unskilled labor and
the cost of production of the input are lower in the South. Without loss of
generality, we set marginal costs of Southern intermediate good producers equal
to zero. For simplicity, we assume that specialized intermediate good producers
do not incur any ￿xed costs of production. In this part of the paper, we deal
with the case in which the ￿nal good is exclusively consumed in the North.
We start with an equilibrium with pervasive vertical integration. To make
sure this is the initial equilibrium, we assume prohibitive trade costs, so that it
is more costly to import the input than producing it within the ￿rm. Consider
then a market with v symmetric vertically integrated producers competing ￿ la
Cournot. To simplify notation, let waL ￿ ￿ and raHf ￿ k in equation (2), so
that the cost structure of each ￿rm is equal to:
TCV = ￿qV + k
Pro￿t Maximization, subject to the demand function in (1) yields the following







We get the standard results that quantity is negatively related to marginal costs







Industry producer surplus consists of industry pro￿ts minus ￿xed costs:






The linear speci￿cation for the demand function easily allows us to express the





v (￿ ￿ ￿)
1 + v
￿2
Following Horn and Levinsohn ([21]), the reduced form welfare level in the model
economy under consideration consists of consumer surplus and producer surplus
(inclusive of industry ￿xed costs):














Notice that in the case of free entry operating pro￿ts of ￿rms would just cover
the ￿xed costs and the producer surplus would be zero. Depending on the task
of the Competition Authority, whether its duty is to maximize the consumer
surplus or total welfare, the optimal number of ￿rms may di⁄er.
83.1 Competition policy under vertical integration
We now introduce a Competition Authority (CA), whose mandate is to maxi-
mize national welfare by choosing the optimal number of ￿rms. In a situation
in which ￿rms are vertically integrated, the CA sets (WV )v = 0. The optimal









The optimal number of ￿rms is negatively related to the size of the ￿xed costs
and positively to its marginal costs. For this to be an equilibrium, we impose
the condition ￿V I (v￿) ￿ 0, which translates into the following lower bound on
￿xed costs: k ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2
3.
3.1.1 Comparison with Free Entry equilibrium
In a free entry equilibrium, each producer makes zero pure pro￿ts: ￿V I = 0.









The optimal number of ￿rms set by a CA is lower than under free entry, re￿ ecting
the trade o⁄ between ￿xed costs savings and lower consumer surplus due to less
competition.
4 Outsourcing
We now want to study how competition policy should optimally react to an
industry change in business operations. The easiest scenario to consider is one
in which, due to an exogenous reduction in trade costs, outsourcing becomes
viable. Importantly, we assume no contracting costs between Northern and
Southern ￿rms, as well as no search costs. Furthermore, we assume that skilled
labor is prohibitively expensive in the South, so that it is not viable to shift
the entire production of the ￿nal good there (recall that high skilled labor is
needed to cover ￿xed costs). These assumptions, together with symmetry across
￿rms within the same nation, imply that there will be a shift to pervasive foreign
outsourcing: the intermediate good will be produced in the South, at lower mar-
ginal cost, while the assembling will be conducted in the North. For simplicity,
we let ￿xed costs for ￿nal good producers be the same under outsourcing and
under vertical integration. This assumption is easily justi￿ed by noting that
￿xed costs exclude the costs of physical production, as explained above.
We denote by m the number of intermediate good producers in the South.
They engage in Cournot competition among them. On the other hand, we
denote by n be the number of ￿nal good producers engaging in outsourcing.
In a situation in which the number of ￿rms does not change, n is equal to
9v. However, if the CA optimally sets the number of domestic ￿rms taking into
account their cost structure (see equation (5)), n will generally be di⁄erent from
v.
4.1 Free entry in the South
Consider ￿rst the simple case of free entry in the South. In the absence of ￿xed
costs, the price of the intermediate good is equal to its marginal costs c, set
equal to zero. With no ￿nal good consumption and zero producer surplus in
the South, we can thus limit our analysis to the Northern market only.
As before, Norther ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot, facing linear demand and
producing homogenous goods. The cost structure for the j￿ th Northern ￿rm
that outsources the production of the input to the South is equal to:
TCj = w￿a￿
Lx + raHf
= w￿aLx + k
= cx + k
where x is the quantity of the intermediate good bought from Southern ￿rms.
Using the simple relabling technology described above, we have that the output
of a Northern ￿rm, q, is equal to x; furthermore, since we let c = 0, we have
TC = k. Pro￿t maximization under the linear demand in (1) then yields:









4.1.1 Optimal competition policy
Let￿ s compute the unconstrained optimal (from the point of view of a CA max-
imizing domestic welfare) number of ￿rms and then check whether this equilib-
rium is implementable. The relevant welfare function is:






















Under the assumption that kO < kV , one can easily check that n￿ is higher
than v￿. However, we have to make sure that ￿rms will make more pro￿ts than
under vertical integration, so that outsourcing is also optimal for Northern ￿rms
(participation constraint). We thus equate pro￿ts for the n and v types; and
10check that pro￿ts are not lower than before. Equating (3) to (6) and solving for
n, we can ￿nd the maximum number of ￿nal good producers such that each of









where we have used v￿ for the number of vertically integrated producers. This
puts an upper limit on the number of ￿nal goods producers in the North. In
order for n￿ to be implementable, it must be smaller than n. The di⁄erence
between the optimal number of ￿rms under outsourcing and n is equal to:






















It is easy to show that this di⁄erence is always negative, since ￿ > ￿. In words,
the optimal number of ￿rms under outsourcing in always less than the maximum
number of ￿rms that a market with outsourcing can sustain. From the point
of view of the CA, this means that this constraint is not binding, and it can
impose the optimal number of ￿rms in an outsourcing equilibrium, given in (6).
Having established this result, we can compare n￿ and v￿ to see that:
Observation 1 With free entry in the South and consumers only in the North,
the optimal number of Northern ￿rms under outsourcing, n￿, is unambigu-
ously higher than the optimal number of ￿rms under vertical integration,
v￿. A CA seeking to maximize national welfare should adopt a tougher
competition policy stance following a switch to an outsourcing mode.
The intuition is that under outsourcing ￿nal good producers can produce at
lower marginal costs so their ex ante expected pro￿ts are higher. Hence, entry
is more pro￿table than before; since ￿xed costs are unchanged, the market can
support a higher number of ￿rms.
5 Welfare under an inactive CA
Consider now the counterfactual scenario of a passive Competition Authority
that does not react to an industry switch to an outsourcing mode. Is inaction
costly? We establish that inaction leads to a welfare loss which is higher, the
more relevant marginal cost savings from outsourcing and the lower the price
elasticity of demand.
11In the case in which the CA does not re-optimize and keeps the number of









(1 + v￿)2 ￿ k (10)
The non-reoptimized welfare level is:














where 0 is the e⁄ective marginal cost of the input paid by ￿nal good producers
when they outsource. If the CA re-optimizes, on the other hand, welfare is given
by equation (7), where n is the optimal number of ￿nal good producers as in
equation (8). Plugging equation (5) into (11) and equation (8) into (7), we can
compute the mistake done by the CA when it ignores the shift to outsourcing
(plotted in Figure 1):11
Figure 1. Welfare costs of myopic CA
As one can see, the welfare cost of non reoptimizing is higher the more
important are marginal cost reductions associated with outsourcing. It is also
possible to show that this cost is decreasing in the price elasticity ￿. Intuitively,
the higher the elasticity of the demand, the more the outsourcing ￿rm will be
forced to pass on the cost saving to consumers. Therefore, the policy implication
is that in a very elastic market it may not be very costly not to reoptimize. We
summarize this result in the next observation:
11Notice that Figure 1 is drawn ignoring the normalization ￿ = 1 and for a positive level
of marginal costs associated to outsourcing (c > 0). As previously noted in the text, the
normalizations of ￿ and c are without loss of generality.
12Observation 2 A CA seeking to maximize national welfare should be more
reactive to an industry shift to outsourcing the more relevant marginal
cost savings and the lower the price elasticity of demand.
5.1 Competition Authority in the South
In the previous section we analyzed the optimal competition policy in the North,
while assuming the number of Southern ￿rms to be determined by free entry.
Now, we consider the case of a Competition Authority in the South, whose
mandate is the same as its Northern homologue, i.e., setting the optimal number
of ￿rms that maximizes domestic welfare.
As we will see, the Southern CA has an interest to limit competition among
intermediate producers, in order to appropriate outsourcing rents. This result,
however, crucially depends on the geographical distribution of consumers. With
no ￿nal good consumption in the South, it is optimal for the Southern CA to
engage in beggar-thy-neighbor behavior, so as to fully shift outsourcing rents to
Southern ￿rms.
We consider a two-stages game, in which each stage is a strategic interaction
in itself. In the ￿rst stage there is strategic interaction between the Northern and
the Southern Competition Authority. In the second stage, there is interaction
between ￿nal good producers in the North and suppliers in the South. To
keep the model tractable, we model their interaction as a two-stage game of
perfect information. To ￿nd the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use backward
induction, both for the overall game and for the game played between m-types
and n-types.
Consider ￿rst the game played between m-types and n-types. In the ￿rst
stage, intermediate good producers maximize pro￿ts taking into account the
demand of ￿nal good producers; in the second stage, ￿nal good producers max-




qi. The i￿ th ￿nal good producer facing ￿xed costs equal to k and input
price pm will then:
max
qs
￿n = pn (Q)qn ￿ pmqn ￿ k
s:t:
￿

























At stage one, an intermediate good producer with cost structure TCm = cqm,
facing an inverse demand given by (13) will then solve the following maximiza-
tion problem:











The second constraint is imposed because the Southern producer cannot charge
a price higher than the marginal costs of the vertical integrated ￿rm in the North,
otherwise there would be no outsourcing. If this participation constrained is
ful￿lled - and using c = 0) the solution to this problem yields:
qm =
n￿
(1 + n)(1 + m)
qn =
m￿
(1 + n)(1 + m)
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Consider now the interaction between the Northern and the Southern CA.
If all consumers are in the North - as we have assumed so far - the Southern
CA has no interest in adopting a tougher competition policy stance towards its
intermediate goods producers, since this would only in￿ uence negatively domes-
tic welfare. In this case the constraint ￿v ￿ ￿n is binding with equality, and
there is no meaningful interaction between Competition Authorities. In fact,
the Southern CA will make sure that outsourcing rents are fully appropriated
by the South, by setting the number of domestic ￿rms compatible such that
Northern ￿rms are just equally well o⁄ as before outsourcing. The maximum
14number of intermediate good producers such that price they charge is equal to




Since there is no ￿nal good consumption, the Southern CA will either set m =
m. We represent the participation constraint for Northern ￿rms in Figure 2
(drawn for a particular parametric con￿guration):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








Profits with outsourcing with high marginal cost savings
Profits of a vertically integrated firm
Profits with outsourcing with limited marginal cost savings
Figure 2. Pro￿ts under vertical integration and outsourcing
In the Figure, m is determined at the intersection between the pro￿t line of
vertical integration and the pro￿t line of outsourcing. Notice that pro￿ts for
the Northern ￿rms are increasing w.r.t. the situationof vertical integration only
for m higher than m, which is not the case here because the Southern CA has
an incentive to extract all outsourcing rents. It is however possible to restrict
the number of intermediate goods producers below m, this does however not
bring any further improvement in terms of the maximum amount of rents that
can be shifted to the South, given that any higher price for the intermediate
good would violate the PC of Northern ￿rms.
Interestingly, the Northern CA￿ s best policy changes in this case with respect
to the case of free entry in the South analyzed above: it would not have to adopt
a tougher stance following outsourcing, since Northern ￿rms do not experience
any marginal cost saving anymore. The results in terms of number of ￿rms and
welfare are thus identical to the one obtained above (n = v￿, WN = WN(v￿)).
We summarize these results in Observation 3 below:
15Observation 3 With a CA and no ￿nal good consumption in the South, there
is room for rent shifting. The Southern CA will appropriate outsourcing
rents. The response of the CA in the North to an industry shift to out-
sourcing is to keep the number of ￿rms unchanged. There is no interest
in adopting a tougher stance any longer.
In this case, we have seen that competition policy can entirely substitute
for trade policy as a rent-extraction instrument. Notice that the extraction of
outsourcing rents is implemented without any restriction on international trade.
6 The model with consumers in both countries
We now relax the assumption that all consumers are situated in the North.
The interesting question is to analyze the incentives of the Southern CA to
engage in rent-shifting activities and how the Northern homologue will react
strategically to such a move from the South. To keep the model tractable, we
conduct this analysis by assuming no ￿xed costs either in the North or in the
South.12 We also assume that the ￿nal good can be exported at zero trade cost
by Northern producers (so that there is free trade both on the input and the
output market). Throughout the analysis, we denote sN the share of Northern
consumption in total consumption; by normalizing world consumption to one,
the share of Southern consumption is equal to 1 ￿ sN.
The geographical distribution of consumers plays a key role in determining
the structure of the strategic interaction. If s is high enough, i.e. almost all
consumption is the North, the Northern CA￿ s best response is to adopt a more
lenient competition policy stance in order to protect its consumers. For the
Southern CA, its interest is still in extracting as much rents as possible. There
is no Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium. Or in other words, the
gain to Southern consumers as a result of globally optimal competition policy
of free entry is not enough to compensate the loss of Southern producer surplus.
In the second case when sN is low enough, the Nash equilibrium is Pareto
suboptimal and global free entry would be mutually bene￿cial. The game has
the characteristics of a Prisoners￿Dilemma.
As mentioned the globally optimal competition policy which maximizes
global welfare would be marginal cost pricing in the North as well as in the
South. In this case welfare would only consist of consumer surplus, equal to
W￿ = ￿
2
2 : The level of welfare corresponding to the globally optimal competi-
tion policy for each country is thus equal to:
12In Appendix A1 we show that the results obtained are not senistive to this assumption.
Hence, with no ￿xed costs, the results are qualitatively, although not quantitatively, compa-











In a decentralized system however each CA sets the number of domestic
￿rms taking the other CA￿ s course of action as given. The relevant objective










































= 2 ￿ sN (18)
We get the surprisingly easy result that the number of ￿rms uniquely depends
on the geographical distribution of consumers. Inspection of (17) and (18)
reveals that, in the (unconstrained) Nash setting, the Northern CA is much
more sensitive than the Southern to the geographical distribution of consumers.
When most of the consumers are in the North, the Northern CA optimally sets a
large number of domestic ￿rms. The Southern CA, on the other hand, optimally
sets a monopoly (for high sN) or a duopoly (for low sN).
De￿ning cooperation as a policy of free entry (which, as emphasized, corre-
sponds the globally optimal outcome) and defection as the Nash setting of the
number of ￿rms (given in (17) and (18)), we can represent the outcomes of the



























17What follows below is the discussion of how strategic actions depend on the
distribution of consumers. When consumers are evenly distributed, a coopera-
tive equilibrium would represent a Pareto improvement for both of them. From
the perspective of the Southern CA, the move to cooperation may become prob-
lematic when the share of its consumers is to small. The objective is to ￿nd
sN, such that the Southern CA is indi⁄erent between the cooperative outcome
and the defection/defection outcome. Note that a cooperative outcome means
that the producer surplus goes to zero, in return for lower prices and a higher
consumer surplus. For any level of sN below sN, the interaction between CA￿ s
has the structure of a PD. For any level of sN above sN, on the other hand, it
will have the characteristics of a deadlock game.
The cut-o⁄ level of sN is in most cases not uniquely speci￿ed and depends
very much on the maximum level of rents that can be shifted to the South, which
in turn depends upon the level of costs savings due to o⁄shoring. If marginal cost
savings are huge, it is possible to charge prices which correspond to a duopoly
or a monopoly. In this case the outcome is the unconstrained maximum given
above. However, such an outcome may not be feasible if it is not consistent with
the participation constraint of Northern ￿rms given that ￿nal good producers
in the North have always the possibility to continue to produce the input as
vertically integrated ￿rms. They will only outsource if ex-post pro￿ts are bigger
or equal to the ex -ante pro￿ts. If the South charges a price for the intermediate
good which is too high and does not respect the participation constraint of
Northern ￿rms, the demand will drop to zero. If marginal cost savings are
important enough, the participation constraint of Northern ￿rm is not binding.
In such a situation rent shifting is very lucrative and the share of consumers in
the South must be important in order to compensate for the producer surplus
loss.
The second case arises when marginal costs are less important. The price
the South can charge for the intermediate goods is capped at a level such that
the participation constraint of Northern ￿rms is just binding. In this case a
monopoly in the South is not able to extract monopolistic rents. Given the
fact that the level of rent extraction is increasing in marginal cost saving, lower
marginal costs saving require a lower share of consumption in the South in
order to make them indi⁄erent between consumer protection and rent extraction.
So sN lays somewhere inbetween the unconstrained sN (which, as shown in
Appendix A2, is equal to 2 ￿
p
2) and one, where the later corresponds to the
situation in which cost savings from o⁄shoring are just marginal.
In the constrained rent shifting case, the number of ￿rms in the South can
actually be higher than m = 2￿sN: As long as the more competitive outcome of
more ￿rms in the South does not lead to a price of intermediate goods for which
the participation constraint for Northern ￿rms is not binding anymore, the rent
shifted to the South do not change. The numerical results used to construct
Figure 2 show that, for a given parametric con￿guration, any restriction on the
number of ￿rms below ten did not result in higher rents. We do assume in this
case that the CA does then impose the least restrictive outcome.
18We summarize the main results of this section in the following observations:
Observation 4 If the ￿nal good is consumed both in the North and in the
South, the Northern CA has an incentive to protect Northern consumers
which is higher, the higher sN. The incentives of the Southern CA to
protect Souther consumers, on the other hand, only marginally depend on
sN, since the Southern CA can in￿ uence consumer surplus only indirectly.
Observation 5 If the share of Southern consumers in world consumption is
high enough, the interaction between Competition Agencies assumes the
traits of a standard Prisoner￿ s Dilemma, whereby mutual cooperation is
preferred to mutual defection and the Nash equilibrium is Pareto sub-
optimal. A mutual agreement on the conduct of competition policy be-
tween the Northern and the Southern CA would Pareto-dominate the
unilateral Nash policy.
7 Conclusions
Foreign outsourcing of intermediate components is a salient feature of a pro-
gressively globalized world economy. The phenomenon is particularly marked
by North-South ￿ ows, whereby labor-intensive components are produced in de-
veloping countries and reassembled in developed nations. In this paper, we have
studied the interaction between this phenomenon and competition policy, using
a simple model of oligopoly and di⁄erent competition policy structures between
two countries, North and South.
The ￿rst part of the paper deals with the situation in which consumers are
only present in the North. The starting point is one of vertical integration and
prohibitively high trade costs. The good is produced at home. As trade costs
fall below a certain threshold, it becomes attractive to o⁄shore parts of the
production process.
In a setting in which competition policy is only conducted in the North,
we have found that competition policy should become more restrictive under
outsourcing. On the other hand, in a setting in which competition policy is
conducted both in the North and in the South, outsourcing rents can be ap-
propriated by the South, at a rate depending on the geographical distribution
of consumers. In this case, the response of competition policy in the North
to outsourcing is crucially determined by the optimal policy in the South, and
inaction becomes optimal under full appropriation of rents. From a global com-
petition policy point of view, the optimal one is one of marginal cost pricing in
the South (no ￿xed costs) and one of an optimal number of ￿rms in the North
which respect the condition of equating the marginal pro￿ts of one more ￿rm
with ￿xed costs. From an institutional perspective, the optimal outcome can
only be achieved if we allow for money transfers from the North to the South.
The second part of the paper assumes, contrary to the ￿rst one, that con-
sumers are located both in the North and in the South. The situation becomes
more complex. We assumed for simplicity that ￿xed costs are zero; under such
19a situation the optimal competition policy from global welfare point of view
is to enforce free entry in the North as well as in the South. In a world with
decentralized competition policy, the Nash equilibrium is one in which both
CA￿ s restrict competition and the outcome is globally suboptimal. As we have
shown in the ￿rst part, when there are no consumer in the South, this situation
is also Pareto optimal (the North cannot be made better o⁄ without making
the South worse o⁄). With an increasing number of Southern consumers, the
protection of the consumer surplus becomes marginally more attractive. For a
su¢ cient low level of sN, the Nash equilibrium is no longer Pareto optimal. The
case of mutual cooperation (free entry, free entry) is preferred by both actors
over mutual defection. The structure is however that of a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
(PD), where unilateral defection is a dominant strategy. Given the strategic
interaction it is necessary to have some agreements between the CAs such that
cooperation can be sustained. It must be emphasized that this result is valid
ceteris paribus. In fact - for a given sN - the incentives of the Southern CA
to engage in negotiations over competition policy coordinations are dictated by
the marginal cost savings of outsourcing: the more marginal cost saving are
important, the smaller the incentives to ￿nd mutually cooperative solutions.
The main message of this paper is that if globalization leads to higher growth
rates in consumption in the South than in the North - then the incentives to
strike agreements on competition policy between "developed" and "developing"
nations increase with globalization. However, such a cooperation may not be
easily achieved if, for example, the interaction between Competition Agencies
is of the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma type. In this case, to successfully overcome the
tendency of players to defect, strong agreements should be established - with
provisions for detection of non-cooperative behavior and retaliation measures.
8 Avenue for future research
The theoretical model developed above predicts that globalization - and in par-
ticular the increase in the consumption share in the South - should ease inter-
national cooperation on competition policy issues. We would like to test this
prediction empirically.
We should observe that - ceteris paribus - the probability of having inter-
national cooperation on competition policy is increasing, the lower the income
di⁄erence and the higher the amount of intra-industry trade (as a proxy for
trade in components) between the two countries are.
We are currently collecting data on country-pairs, specifying whether they
have an agreement on competition policy issues. The resulting left-hand side
variable is a dummy, so the empirical estimation will be a limited dependent
variable model of the Probit-type.
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22Appendix A1
In Section 6 we provided a closed form solution to the strategic competition
policy game, however under the simplifying assumption that ￿xed costs are
zero. The simulations results shown in this Appendix suggest that ￿xed costs
do have no qualitative impact on the solutions.
Adding ￿xed costs, the optimal solution under cooperation is to limit the
number of ￿rms in the market such that the marginal bene￿t of adding one
more ￿rm is equal to its ￿xed costs. Free entry is no longer optimal, but still
the optimal outcome is close to the one corresponding with free entry.
For the non-cooperative outcome, the results are basically identical to the
one without ￿xed costs. Fixed costs actually do also have a negative impact on
the optimal number of ￿rms in the South. Since the optimal number of ￿rms is
already very low (1 or 2) the only impact on result is that a monopoly becomes
slightly more attractive. In a sense, the fact of having strategic actions com-
pletely dominates all other factors. Basically the results become mathematically
much more involved but do not add any further intuition to the results with-
out ￿xed costs. This is clear in Figure A1, where we compute cooperative and
non-cooperative welfare levels for di⁄erent levels of ￿xed costs (with parameters
￿ = 1000, ￿ = 0:5 and sN = 0:5):
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It is also interesting to see how results change with di⁄erent distributions of
consumers. Not surprisingly, the loss due to non-cooperation is decreasing in
sN. The more consumers are in the North, the smaller is the loss due to strategic
competition policy. The intuition is the following. The South￿ s objective is to
shift part of the producer surplus from the ￿nal good producers in the North
to the South. The reaction of the Northern CA is to reduce the number of ￿nal
goods producers with the objective to shift Southern consumer surplus to the
North. With increasing sN the Northern consumer surplus grows in importance,
23or the bene￿ts of reducing the number of ￿rms becomes smaller whereas the costs
in terms of the domestic consumer surplus grows in importance. However the
incentive of the Southern CA to react to di⁄erent distributions of consumers is
less, since it can only in￿ uence its own consumer surplus indirectly by lowering
the price of intermediate goods.
Figure A2. Welfare levels with and without
cooperation
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Appendix A2
Here we determine the unconstrained sN, de￿ned as the maximum level of sN for
which the interaction between the two CA￿ s is of the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma type.
sN corresponds to the situation in which the South is indi⁄erent between the







The resulting quadratic equation has two roots, one of which is bigger then one.
The unique acceptable solution is thus the one which is smaller than one, equal
to 2 ￿
p
2.
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